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Symposium Article 
The Right to a Genuine Electoral Democracy 
Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznai 
Abstract 
The right to electoral democracy has long been endorsed by 
international law. Yet after dramatic global waves of 
democratization, in recent years democracy has been in recession. 
The lack of a strong consolidation of democracy in the 
international community finds its roots in early faults of 
international mechanisms: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which did not explicitly support the right to live in a 
democratic regime with a multiparty political system, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
guarantees the right to “genuine elections” but failed to clarify 
whether these guarantee required party pluralism. Since half of 
the world’s population now live under hybrid or authoritarian 
regimes, international law must take strong and progressive 
actions for embracing periodic genuine elections as the 
foundation of the international community. Steps must be taken 
to clarify that single-party elections and alike are incompatible 
with genuine elections, as they cannot guarantee the free will of 
the electors, and to ensure that election processes are free, fair and 
ultimately—genuine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, eminent international law scholar Thomas Franck 
published in the American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 
his seminal work on The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, which initiated an imperative discussion on the 
right to democracy in international law.1 Nearly two decades 
later, in two contributions to the European Journal of 
International Law (EJIL), Susan Marks shed further light on 
various engagements of the ‘emerging right of democratic 
governance,” including its legal status and prospects, its 
relationship to international peace, the influence of 
securitization,2 and the link between human development and 
democratic governance.3 In response, Jean d’Aspremont agreed 
that the post-1989 practice indicated that democracy had 
become a prominent benchmark by which to assess governments’ 
legitimacy.4 However, d’Aspremont noted that more recent 
practices endangered the consolidation of practices that focused 
on the democratic origin of governments.5 Instead, modern 
practices focused on the manner in which governments exercised 
power (for example concentrating more towards the respect for 
basic rights than on the exercise of free and fair elections).6 We 
wish to continue and contribute to this debate in light of the 
events following the Arab Spring and the recent decline of global 
democratic institutions.7 
The great hope sparked by the Arab Spring was followed by 
great disappointment. Aside from the developments in Tunisia, 
the Arab Spring has not spawned democratic regimes in the 
region but, rather, has given rise to bloodshed which has reached 
unimaginably horrifying proportions.8 Due to the presupposition 
 
 1. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992). 
 2. Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance?, 22(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 507, 510 (2011). 
 3. Id. at 515–17. 
 4. Jean d’Aspremont, The Rise and Fall of Democratic Government in 
International Law: A Reply to Susan Marks, 22(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 549, 549 
(2011). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Amichai Magen, The Democratic Entitlement in an Era of Democratic 
Recession, 4(2) CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 368, 368 (2015). 
 8. See, e.g., JOHN L. ESPOSITO, TAMARA SONN & JOHN O. VOLL, ISLAM AND 
DEMOCRACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 3 (2015). 
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that democratic regimes would have minimized the bloodshed, 
and considering concerns about the legitimacy of military 
intervention against dictatorial regimes, the debate regarding 
the existence of a right to democracy has resurfaced.9 
Indeed, at least in Syria, the link between the right to life 
and the right to democracy appears stronger than ever.10 Many 
refer to the slaughter in Syria as “the Syrian tragedy”11—yet this 
is no Greek drama. The daily horrors are not an affliction sent 
by gods to punish human beings for their sins. Had Syria been 
governed by a democratically elected government, Bashar al-
Assad’s regime could have been replaced in elections and not in 
a revolt with grave human consequences.12 Domestic bloodshed 
would have probably been avoided. One of the main reasons for 
the deaths of thousands of civilians is plain: where there are no 
ballots, there are bullets.13 
The right to democracy is not merely a collective right of “a 
people”—which is inherently vague and difficult to implement—
but a personal right to live in a democratic government which is 
supplementary to the accepted international bill of rights. Just 
as the right to life is antecedent to all other rights,14 the right to 
live in a democratic regime is central to the right to life and, 
more broadly, important to a broader set of rights, since “respect 
 
 9. Compare Margaret G. Hermann & Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Ballots, a 
Barrier Against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military 
Intervention, 40(3) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 436, 436 (1996) (explaining that 
democracies are generally unlikely to be the target of military intervention), 
with REIN MÜLLERSON, REGIME CHANGE: FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORIES 
TO FORCIBLE REGIME CHANGE 175–78 (2013) (showing that attempts to expand 
the circle of democracy may lead to breaches of peace by justifying foreign 
intervention with democratic peace theories). 
 10. See generally TOM COOPER, SYRIAN CONFLAGRATION: THE SYRIAN CIVIL 
WAR 2011–2013, 22–27 (2015) (showing how the lack of democracy resulted in 
civilian massacres). 
 11. See, e.g., Jonathan Stevenson, The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent, 56(3) 
SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 121, 121 (2014) (labeling the situation in 
Syria as the “Syrian Tragedy”). 
 12. See generally COOPER, supra note 10, at 9–11 (portraying an overview 
on the ongoing conflict in Syria). 
 13. See Dominic M. Ayine, Ballots as Bullets?: Compliance with Rules and 
Norms Providing for the Right to Democratic Governance: An African 
Perspective, 10 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 709, 733 (1998). 
 14. See, e.g., BERTRAND MATHIEU, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEANS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW 15 (2006); B.G. Ramcharan, 
The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1985); Christian Tomuschat, 
The Right to Life—Legal and Political Foundations, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 3, 3–
6 (Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Langrange & Stefan Oeter eds., 2010). 
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for human rights . . . greatly depends on the extent of 
democracy.”15 Again, this reasoning is instrumental to 
understanding the integral relationship between the right to 
democracy and the right to life. Democratic regimes in the 
Middle East and elsewhere would have minimized, if not 
eliminated, the number of civilians who paid for the lack of 
democracy in their countries with their lives. 
The right to live in a democracy is a “gateway” right through 
which the primordial right to life can be achieved,16 as it removes 
the threat of arbitrary death at the hands of a tyrannical regime. 
Additionally, experience demonstrates that democracies do not 
go to war against each other.17 Yet, international law has not yet 
satisfactorily guaranteed the right of an individual to live in a 
democracy.18 
Section II of the article reviews the right to democracy in 
international law in light of the main international human 
rights instruments. In this section, we argue that the inadequate 
recognition of a right to democracy in international law 
originates from an unfortunate compromise with the former 
Soviet Union allowing a one-party electoral system. Section III 
 
 15. F. Menghistu, The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements, in THE RIGHT 
TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 80; see Thilo Rensmann, 
Munich Alumni and the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 22(4) 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 973, 988 (2011) (describing how Karl Loewenstein, the father of 
the right to democracy, claimed that “human rights were not neutral in relation 
to the frame of the government. History has shown, and this was also his 
personal experience, that human rights can be realized only in a democracy. 
Since a democratic constitution was accordingly an indispensable condition for 
the effective realization of human rights, an international bill of rights without 
this structural condition sine qua non would make no sense.”). 
 16. Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 12(3) 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206–07 (1983) (explaining that the right to democracy is 
necessary to uphold other liberal rights). 
 17. Dean V. Babst, Elective Governments—A Force for Peace, 3 WIS. 
SOCIOLOGIST 9, 10 (1964); JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS AND BULLETS: THE ELUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC PEACE 3 (2000); see DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael 
E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995). But see EDWARD 
D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING 
DEMOCRACIES GO TO WAR 7 (2005) (“Although mature democracies have never 
fought a war against each other, incomplete transitions from autocracy toward 
democracy are fraught with the danger of violent conflict in states whose 
political institutions are weak.”); James D. Fearson & David D. Laitin, 
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97(1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 84–85 (2003) 
(detailing how the risk of internal conflict or civil war rises in democratizing 
states with weak institutions). 
 18. See Marks, supra note 2, at 522 (explaining how, despite an emerging 
entitlement, a right to democracy has not been fully established in international 
law). 
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reviews regional efforts for the promotion of the right to 
democracy in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. Section IV 
discusses the current reality in which, notwithstanding the right 
to democracy, only half of the world’s countries are considered 
full or flawed democracies. This points to a failure of 
international law to promote democracy. Section V outlines our 
modest proposals for strengthening the right to a genuine 
electoral democracy. We argue that the international community 
should make a clear statement that genuine elections require a 
multiparty and pluralist electoral system. Moreover, we call for 
an obligatory monitoring system that is overseen the United 
Nations (U.N.). 
II. THE RIGHT TO ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. THE ORIGINAL SIN 
The U.N. Charter opens with the lofty but empty phrase 
“[we the peoples]”.19 This phrase, which is modeled after the 
Preamble of the United States Constitution, seems to express a 
democratic basis for the U.N.20 Hans Kelsen criticized this 
opening, stating that the U.N. Charter is an international treaty 
concluded by governments’ representatives, not representatives 
of the people, and that some of the represented states do not 
acknowledge the political ideology of popular sovereignty.21 
Moreover, democracy is neither mentioned in the Charter nor is 
a commitment to democratic ideals a condition for admission as 
a member state.22 In fact, many non-democratic regimes are 
U.N. member states.23 Furthermore, the U.N. has itself been 
criticized as a non-democratic institution by virtue of the veto 
power accorded to the five permanent members of the Security 
 
 19. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 20. Bardo Fassbender, ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations: Constituent 
Power and Constitutional Form in International Law, in THE PARADOX OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 269, 
286 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). 
 21. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 7 (1950). 
 22. See generally THOMAS D. GRANT, ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS: 
CHARTER ARTICLE 4 AND THE RISE OF UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATION 21 (2009) 
(discussing a summary of criteria for admissions to the United Nations). 
 23. Sean Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and 
Governments, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 556 (1999). 
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Council.24 
The right to live under a democratic form of government 
formally came into existence as an international legal right in 
1948.25 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, expresses the concept 
of democracy by stating in Article 21 that: 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service 
in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority 
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic 
and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.26 
Depending on how the vague term “genuine elections” is 
interpreted, the right to vote is thus obliquely mentioned. 
However, this phrasing does not seem to encompass a right to 
vote in contested, multi-party elections, nor the right to present 
a candidate or establish a party. And in fact, as Marc Plattner 
writes, “the provision of Article 21 calling for ‘genuine’ elections 
has been consistently violated by many UN [sic] member states 
with one-party or other dictatorial governments.”27 As such, it is 
 
 24. Same Varayudej, The Right to Democracy in International Law: Its 
Implications for Asia, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006). 
 25. Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal 
Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 289, 290 
(1995). 
 26. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 27. MARC F. PLATTNER, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS?: GLOBAL 
CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 67 (2007). See also Franck, supra note 1, 
at 64 (“At the time, only UN [sic] members outside the socialist, Arab and Latin 
American blocs took this as a restatement of conditions already prevailing in 
their polis. With rapid decolonization, the proportion of UN [sic] members 
actually practicing free and open electoral democracy began to shrink further 
under the aegis of one-party modernizing authoritarianism in Africa and Asia. 
Nevertheless, even in that relatively hostile atmosphere, few states were willing 
openly to block the textual evolution of a specific electoral entitlement, however 
many mental reservations their regimes may have harbored.”). 
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an empty right to vote in a Soviet-style one-party dictatorial 
state—the attitude of the Declaration toward democracy having 
been tailored to make it palatable to the U.S.S.R. Communist 
system.28 During the drafting sessions, the Belgian delegate 
proposed to include the words “according to the party system” 
after the word “periodic”—pointing to the right to form political 
parties—since “a duality or plurality of parties . . . was essential 
to the efficient functioning of the democratic system.”29 However, 
the Belgian delegate withdrew his amendment after an objection 
by the Soviet delegate who reasoned that “under the prevailing 
[Soviet] system . . . [there is] no justification for the creation of 
other parties . . . [and that the amendment was] absolutely 
irreconcilable with the social structure of certain member 
States.”30 
It is, therefore, apparent that the UDHR does not explicitly 
support the right to live in a democratic regime with a 
multiparty political system with all the accompanying rights 
such as the right to propose candidates or establish parties.31 
Moreover, the UDHR does not have binding force and does not 
incorporate any institutional enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure the observance of the rights declared therein.32 Christina 
Cerna writes that for decades, until the end of the Cold War and 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, Article 21 was honored more in the 
breach than in the observance.33 Indeed, Hurst Hannum casts 
doubts on whether Article 21 actually reflects international law 
as practiced: “Despite the arguments of some that a ‘right to 
democracy’ may be emerging as a norm of international 
customary law, it is apparent that many states have not 
accepted Article 21’s guarantee of the right to participate in the 
political life of one’s country.”34 
 
 28. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 58–61 (1999). 
 29. Id. at 60. 
 30. Id. at 61. 
 31. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 20, ¶ 1 (declaring only that “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”); see Morsink, supra 
note 28, at 60 (showing how, although, previous drafts expressly stated that 
freedom of peaceful assembly included the right to form political parties, this 
language was dropped in the final draft). 
 32. Mary Ann Gelndon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2004). 
 33. Cerna, supra note 25, at 290. 
 34. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 287, 348 
(1995) (emphasis added). 
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B. GENUINE ELECTIONS 
In contrast to the UDHR, Article 25 to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), which 
is currently binding upon those 168 States that have ratified it,35 
sets out a much less vague arrangement which corresponds to 
the recognized principles of democratic regimes: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, 
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and 
without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public 
service in his country.36 
Because it guarantees the rights to freedom of expression,37 
peaceful assembly,38 and freedom of association,39 the ICCPR 
lays out the legal basis for the right to democracy under 
international law.40 This conception of democratic governance is 
stated “at a high level of generality—high enough to mask 
important substantive differences among states on the content 
of those principles.”41 However, it is determinate enough to 
 
 35. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 51, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 36. Id. art. 25. 
 37. Id. art. 19. 
 38. Id. art. 21. 
 39. Id. art. 22. 
 40. See Human Rights Committee General Comment 25, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, ¶ 12 (Aug. 27, 1996) (“Freedom of expression, 
assembly and association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of 
the right to vote and must be fully protected.”). 
 41. See David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign 
Intervention, 19 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 659, 664 (1997) (claiming that “[t]he 
international community has long paid lip service to basic principles of 
democratic governance.”); see also Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a 
Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 77 (1988) (noting that the right to 
political participation “expresses less a vital concept meant to universalize 
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establish not only rights for citizens, but additionally, 
obligations for States. These obligations include holding periodic 
elections using the secret ballot and ensuring that elections 
manifest a genuine and a free expression of the will of the 
people.42 Yet, Gregory Fox notes, “[g]iven Cold War tensions, it 
is not surprising that the drafters failed to clarify whether the 
guarantee of a ‘genuine election’. . . required party pluralism.”43 
In fact, Fox remarks that the ICCPR’s travaux preparatoire 
hardly addressed the meaning of the term “genuine,” and the 
issue of party pluralism was not discussed.44 The single effort to 
define the meaning of “genuine” elections came from the Chilean 
delegate.45 He stated, at a late stage in the drafting process, that 
“[t]he adjective ‘genuine’ had been used to guarantee that all 
elections of every kind faithfully reflected the opinion of the 
population and to protect the electors against government 
pressure and fraud.”46 Thus, originally, Article 25 did not 
prohibit one-party elections. 
In the absence of an explicit reference to multi-party 
elections, some states have interpreted this provision as 
allowing one-party elections. These states claim that genuine 
electoral choice does not require the existence of multiple 
political parties or that multiple parties would exacerbate ethnic 
divisions in deeply divided societies and would bring violence.47 
But in order for elections to reflect the free will of the voting 
population, it would seem imperative that candidates and 
political parties representing factions and divisions in society be 
able to actively contest the elections in order to give these 
 
certain practices than a bundle of concepts, sometimes complementary but 
sometimes antagonistic . . . . [O]ften it becomes another weapon of rhetorical 
battle, a convenient, even authoritative concept through which each of the 
world’s ideological blocs, infusing the right with its own understandings, 
attacks the other for violating those understandings.”). 
 42. THE CARTER CTR., STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO SUPPORT 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND GENUINE ELECTIONS 26–27 (2012), 
http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_report_strengthening_democra
tic_governance_.pdf. 
 43. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International 
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 55 (Gregory 
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 
 44. Id. at 56. Travaux préparatoire means the preparatory work of a treaty 
which can be taken as supplementary means of treaty interpretation. See art. 
32 of the United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 
1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 56–57. 
 47. Id. at 56. 
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factions a voice.48 
In any case, the interpretation that Article 25 supports one-
party elections no longer seems to be widely accepted.49 Further, 
it has been stated that “[t]extual determinacy, once again, is 
gradually being augmented by process determinacy under the 
auspices of the Human Rights Committee, which is authorized 
to monitor compliance.”50 For instance, upon receiving a state 
party’s periodic report, the Human Rights Committee 
(Committee) usually questions the state delegates about 
whether opposition parties are permitted, to what extent these 
parties act freely, and whether any parties have been banned.51 
It would, therefore, appear that the Committee has consistently 
expressed its doubts that one-party elections are indeed 
“genuine.”52 
An example in which the Committee came close to explicitly 
dealing with the question of whether a state’s election was free 
concerned Iran’s tenth Presidential election in 2009. In its third 
periodic review of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Committee 
raised its concern about the various flaws in the electoral 
process.53 The Committee was concerned with the right of the 
Guardian Council to reject candidates to the Majlis, noting that 
out of more than 450 prospective candidates, only four 
candidates were approved.54 The Committee also noted that 
international observers were prohibited from monitoring the 
election results and that the election results were approved by 
Ayatollah Khamenei before certification by the Guardian 
Council.55 Additionally, the Committee discussed the arrest of 
dozens of political opposition members in February 2011 as well 
as the dissolution by court order of two pro-reform political 
 
 48. See id. at 57 (showing how a state would have to bar candidates 
representing different factions in order to violate the right to elections); see also 
Christopher C. Joyner, The United Nations and Democracy, 3 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 339, 351 (1999) (explaining how legitimate democracies need 
transparency to prevent negative reactions). 
 49. Gregory H. Fox, Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting, 
19(3) WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 299 (2000); Fox, supra note 43, at 89. 
 50. Franck, supra note 1, at 64. 
 51. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Islamic 
Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. CCRP/C/IRN/CO/3 (Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Iran 
Report] (detailing the conclusions drawn after questions Iran about their 
treatment of opposition parties). 
 52. Fox, supra note 43, at 57. 
 53. Iran Report, supra note 51, ¶ 15. 
 54. Id. ¶ 29. 
 55. Id. 
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parties.56 As a result, the Committee called upon the state to 
amend its law, to ensure that it was in conformity with the rights 
guaranteed in Article 25, and to take adequate steps to 
guarantee that elections were conducted in a free and 
transparent manner.57 
The Committee elaborated on the meaning of Article 25 and 
its doubts toward one-party elections further in other cases. In a 
1993 decision, the Committee held that a one-party system that 
restricts political activity outside the only organized political 
party imposes inherent limitations on genuine electoral choice 
and “an unreasonable restriction on the [ . . . ] right to ‘take part 
in the conduct of public affairs.’”58 That decision came as a result 
of a petition by a Zambian citizen who attempted to run for 
Parliamentary election as a member of an opposition party that 
was banned under Zambia’s one-party system.59 Accordingly, he 
was prevented from participating in the electoral campaign and 
was ultimately detained for thirty-one months on charges of 
belonging to the banned party.60 In a decision concerning the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), a Zairian 
national, Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu, presented his 
candidacy for the presidency of Zaire in conformity with existing 
Zairian law.61 After the rejection of his candidacy, Mpaka-Nsusu 
submitted a proposal to the government requesting recognition 
of a second party in Zaire, the Federal Nationalist Party.62 While 
Mpaka-Nsusu claimed that he acted in accordance with Article 
4 of the 1967 Constitution which envisaged a two-party system, 
he was arrested on July 1, 1979, later detained without trial, and 
banished to his village of origin for an indefinite period.63 
Mpaka-Nsusu then fled the country.64 Based upon the rejection 
of his candidacy, the Committee found a violation of Article 25.65 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Iran Report, supra note 51, ¶ 9. 
 58. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 314/1988, ¶ 6.6, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (July 14, 1993). 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.1. 
 60. Id. ¶ 6.3. 
 61. Human Rights Comm., Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire Views, ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/27/D/157/1983 (Mar. 26, 1983). 
 62. Id. ¶ 1.2. 
 63. Id. ¶ 1.3. Concerning Communication No. 1354/2005, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/100/D/1354/2005 (Oct. 19, 2010). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. ¶ 10. 
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The Committee weighed in on another decision that 
concerned a refusal to register a candidate for the 2004 elections 
to the House of Representatives in Belarus.66 Based on grounds 
of providing incorrect personal data, the Committee noted that 
“article 25 of the Covenant secures to every citizen the right and 
the opportunity to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2, paragraph 
1, including political opinion.”67 In a 2005 decision, the 
Committee found that Cameroon violated Article 25(b) for 
depriving a person’s right to vote and to be elected, without any 
objective and reasonable grounds, holding that “persons who are 
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by 
reason of political affiliation.”68 
In its 1996 General Comment on Article 25, the Committee 
emphasized the centrality of the electoral process to an effective 
democratic system, noting that it “lies at the core of democratic 
government based on the consent of the people . . . .”69 Yet, the 
only references to the ‘genuineness’ of the elections are that: 
. . . [g]enuine periodic elections . . . are essential to 
ensure the accountability of representatives for the 
exercise of the legislative or executive powers vested in 
them. Such elections must be held at intervals which are 
not unduly long and which ensure that the authority of 
government continues to be based on the free expression 
of the will of electors.70 
Additionally, it held that: 
. . . elections must be conducted fairly and freely on a 
periodic basis within a framework of laws guaranteeing 
the effective exercise of voting rights. Persons entitled to 
 
 66. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 1354/2005, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1354/2005 (Oct. 19, 2010). 
 67. Id. ¶ 6.6. 
 68. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights Concerning Communication No. 1134/2002, ¶ 5.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/83/D/1134/2002 (May 10, 2005). 
 69. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Under Article 40, 
Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
General Comment 25 (27), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996). 
 70. Id. ¶ 9. 
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vote must be free to vote for any candidate for election 
and for or against any proposal submitted to referendum 
or plebiscite, and free to support or to oppose 
government, without undue influence or coercion of any 
kind which may distort or inhibit the free expression of 
the elector’s will. Voters should be able to form opinions 
independently, free of violence or threat of violence, 
compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of 
any kind . . . . The results of genuine elections should be 
respected and implemented.71 
These statements do not refer to multiparty systems, yet 
prima facie, one might infer the importance of having multiple-
choices when these statements are read together with other 
paragraphs which protect the “free choice of candidates,”72 “the 
right of persons to stand for election,”73 and “the right to form 
and join political associations.”74 The General Comment stresses 
that “although the Covenant does not impose any particular 
electoral system, any system operating in a State party must be 
compatible with the rights protected by Article 25 and must 
guarantee and give effect to the free expression of the will of the 
electors . . . .”75 This is a specific manifestation of the U.N.’s 
general approach not to promote any specific form of government 
or a particular model or system for democracy.76 This approach 
was clearly demonstrated in 2008 when a complaint was lodged 
against Spain on the basis that the Spanish monarchy is not 
subject to free and public elections. The Committee noted that 
Article 25 “does not impose a specific political model or 
structure” and “that a constitutional monarchy based on 
separation of powers is not in itself contrary to Article 25 of the 
Covenant.”77 
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Indeed, in its review of the parties’ adherence to the ICCPR, 
the Committee deals with alleged violations of Article 25.78 Yet, 
most of the decisions focus on electoral problems within 
governments in which multiparty systems exist, and the 
Committee rarely interferes in authoritarian regimes which do 
not conduct genuine elections.79 As Kofele-Kale notes, 
international responses to violations of the right to democracy 
are very limited and are almost never directed toward the 
removal of repressive and authoritarian governments.80 
The importance of the abovementioned statements 
concerning Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 
Iran should not be overlooked because they assist in advancing 
international law and the interpretation of the ICCPR in a more 
genuine democratic direction. Yet, apart from them, there is no 
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clear, unequivocal clarification as to the nature of genuine 
elections, and, a fortiori, no duty has been imposed upon state 
parties to hold multiparty or multicandidate elections with all 
their accompanied rights. We are still lacking an explicit 
recognition of the right to live in a “genuine” democratic 
government, and “genuine[ss]” remains open to interpretation. 
This allows different types of dictatorships to claim that, due to 
the election conducted in the state, their regimes were 
democratic (even those in which a single candidate receives 
ninety-nine percent of the vote).81 Yannick Lécuyer writes that 
national governments have resisted “a right to free elections in 
international law,” attempting to put obstacles in the terms of 
its recognition, applicability and effectiveness since it was seen 
as a limitation on national sovereignty.82 Accordingly, while the 
U.N. “is constantly promoting democracy, it is less concerned 
with the quality of democracy practices by its members.”83 If the 
omission from the U.N.’s Charter and human rights treaties of 
the right to live under a democratic regime stemmed originally 
from the need to accommodate and placate victorious Soviet 
Communism after World War II,84 it is today dictated by the 
composition of the U.N. itself—the majority of whose members 
are non-democratic in some way—as well as by the fear of 
causing a split within the international community. 
III. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. EUROPE 
In the European Union (EU), things are markedly different. 
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Under the Lisbon Treaty, a state cannot become a member of the 
EU if it does not prove that it has a democratic regime.85 Any 
country seeking membership must conform to the conditions set 
out in Article 49 to the Treaty,86 the principles laid down in 
Article 287—democracy being one of them—and the principles 
established under Title II of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning the democratic principles of the EU itself.88 
Moreover, the criteria established by the Copenhagen European 
Council in 1993 must be met.89 The Madrid European Council in 
1995 and the transatlantic agenda of “promoting peace and 
stability, democracy and development around the world” 
strengthened those criteria.90 
The result of these cumulative conditions is that a new EU 
member state must demonstrate the political stability of its 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The same 
apply to the Council of Europe. The Preamble to the Statute 
creating the Council of Europe states that the member states are 
“reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values 
which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true 
source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, 
principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.”91 
Furthermore, a special body—the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission—
reviews and recommends constitutional and legislative changes 
in countries asking to be accepted into the council and those that 
are already members, and has been active in the electoral field.92 
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http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Elections_and_Referendum
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As democracy is considered one of the pillars of the 
European constitutional heritage and of the Council of Europe, 
together with human rights and the rule of law, elections 
represent a particular aspect of the European constitutional 
heritage which is often termed “European electoral heritage.”93 
This heritage includes core electoral principles such as 
universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage, alongside a set 
of principles without which genuine democratic elections cannot 
be held, such as fundamental rights, the stability of electoral law 
and effective procedural guarantees.94 
In addition to these mechanisms, one should mention 
European human rights law. Whereas the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain any provisions on 
participatory rights, Article 3 of the Protocol I to the ECHR 
stipulates the right to free elections “at reasonable intervals by 
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature.”95 Read literally, this provision seems even narrower 
than Article 25 of the ICCPR as it does not require “genuine 
elections,” and, importantly, does not refer to elections as an 
individual right, but rather as a duty which is imposed upon the 
state parties.96 Nevertheless, the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have interpreted this provision 
broadly according to the abovementioned “European electoral 
heritage” and draw from it both “the right to vote” and “the right 
to stand for election.”97 While the ECtHR has afforded state 
parties a wide margin of discretion in structuring their electoral 
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2002), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CD
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 95. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 96. Fox, supra note 43, at 59. 
 97. See Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 
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systems,98 it is clear that this margin presupposes a multiparty 
system which allows diverse and pluralist dialogue. The ECtHR 
commented on this in its decision concerning Turkey’s banning 
of political parties that support Kurdish separatist movements 
based upon their threat to the state’s unity and territorial 
integrity.99 It held that “it is the essence of democracy to allow 
diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even 
those that call into question the way a State is currently 
organised, provided they do not harm democracy itself.”100 
B. AFRICA 
Processes of democratization are also reflected in Africa’s 
regional law. Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights guarantees every citizen “the right to participate 
freely in the government of his country, either directly or 
through freely chosen representatives . . . .”101 While the Charter 
protects the “free choice,” in contrast with Article 25 of the 
ICCPR, it neither addresses discrimination, universal suffrage, 
or a secret ballot, nor stipulates that electoral choice must reflect 
the free expression of the electors’ will. Lacking such stipulation, 
the Charter may be interpreted as allowing one-party 
elections.102 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the African 
Commission on Human Rights has issued a series of statements 
articulating the principles of electoral democracy as “based on 
the consent of the people freely expressed by them” and 
condemning military governments as clearly violating 
fundamental principles of democracy.103 The principles of 
electoral democracy were reaffirmed in the 2007 African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance,104 of which, according 
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to Article 17 “State Parties re-affirm their commitment to 
regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections . . . .”105 
Notwithstanding these principles, democratization in Africa has 
taken a rather slow pace, with democratic reforms on the one 
hand but striking electoral frauds on the other.106 
C. LATIN AMERICA 
Article 23.1(b) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights follows Article 25 of the ICCPR with minor modifications. 
Article 23.1(b) guarantees the right “to vote and to be elected in 
genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression 
of the will of the voters.”107 Due to the region’s particular 
circumstances, the early jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights mainly focused on states with 
grave violations of human rights and in which ruling parties had 
completely suspended representative government.108 The 
Commission emphasized that the core issue under Article 23 is 
whether elections are “genuine” which, according to the 
Commission, means one without intimidation, fraud, and 
harassment, and that reflect the voters’ will.109 Importantly, the 
Commission has held that one-party states are inherently 
coercive, and consequently, one-party states are incapable of 
holding authentic elections.110 According to the Commission, the 
principle of pluralism is characteristic of a representative 
democracy, and in the absence of which, elections cannot be free 
and genuine.111 
In addition to this jurisprudence, one should mention the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, which was adopted 
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by a special session of the General Assembly of the Organization 
of American States with the central aim of strengthening and 
upholding democratic institutions in the nations of the 
Americas.112 Article 3 of the Charter explicitly states that 
“essential elements of representative democracy include, inter 
alia . . . the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on 
secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the 
sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political 
parties and organizations . . . .”113 Thus, the Charter recognized 
the importance of pluralism and the strengthening of political 
parties.114 Over a decade ago, it was argued that the Democratic 
Charter is one of the most recent examples of an emerging 
international law norm of democratic governance.115 
IV. A RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY IN A NON-
DEMOCRATIC WORLD 
A. HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY EMERGED? 
It might simply be realpolitik, or perhaps the great number 
of non-democratic states within the U.N., but the fact is that the 
gap remains today. The inconsistency between the various 
standards of electoral democracy around the world began with 
the compromise with the U.S.S.R. True, the U.N. General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Council have time and again 
reaffirmed the right to live in a democratic government. For 
example, in one of its resolutions in support of governments’ 
efforts to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, 
the General Assembly encouraged “Member States to promote 
democratization and to make additional efforts to identify 
possible steps to support the efforts of Governments to promote 
and consolidate new or restored democracies.”116 In April 1999, 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 
1999/57 concerning “Promotion of the right to democracy,” which 
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2018]RIGHT TO GENUINE ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY 163 
“[a]ffirms that democracy fosters the full realization of all 
human rights,”117 and that the rights of democratic governance 
include, inter alia “[t]he right of universal and equal suffrage, as 
well as free voting procedures and periodic and free elections”118 
and “the right of political participation . . . .”119 In December 
2000, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that “[c]alls 
upon States to promote and consolidate democracy;”120 however, 
these dramatic declarations were not accompanied by sufficient 
steps for their fulfillment.121 
So, based on various human rights instruments, regional 
developments, and countless declarations by international 
bodies, a line of scholars have been announcing the development 
of a new human right: the right to participate in the political 
process within a democratic government.122 Most famously, 
perhaps, Franck argued that we were in the course of 
consolidating a right to democracy, which was once limited to 
only a few western states: “This newly emerging ‘law’—which 
requires democracy to validate governance . . . [is] becoming a 
requirement of international law applicable to all and 
implemented through global standards, with the help of regional 
and international organizations.”123 To support his conclusion, 
Franck relied upon democratization processes that took place 
towards the end of the Twentieth century, particularly the 
democratic revolution which occurred at the time in the former 
Soviet Union and in Latin America.124 Laurence Whitehead 
claimed in 2004 that “[d]emocratization is now more commonly 
viewed as the norm rather than the exception,”125 and as 
Amichai Magen writes, “over the period 1990–2005 we observe a 
structural shift in the status of democracy, as an ideal and model 
of government, in the international system.”126 Still, many 
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states—some of which are very active in the U.N., and which 
comprise more than one-third of humanity—do not see 
themselves bound by this “new norm” of democratization.127 
In contrast, some argue that there is no right to democracy, 
and that it is undesirable for such a right to exist. Matthew 
Lister, for example, relies on John Rawls to argue that 
recognizing the right to democracy is undesirable because such 
recognition would justify democratic states’ intervention in non-
democratic states.128 Intervention may occur even if the states 
are not systematically responsible for grave human rights 
abuses (such as Saddam Hussain’s Iraq), but rather what he 
terms “decent” non-democracies (such as the Kingdom of Jordan) 
and even in states which are advancing toward decentness.129 
The focus of this article is not on the issue of pro-democratic 
intervention, which deserves its own treatment.130 We would 
mention, however, that even if one takes seriously the 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine and humanitarian 
intervention,131 it is hard to see how the right to democracy 
would justify a use of force. The responsibility to protect doctrine 
acknowledges that the prime responsibility for protecting the 
people rests upon the sovereign state.132 However, when a state 
is unable or unwilling to protect its own people, or when the state 
itself poses a threat to its people, responsibility to protect then 
rests upon the international community.133 Humanitarian 
intervention generally refers to the use of force against a state 
in order to prevent or reduce the suffering of that state’s 
citizens.134 Yet, for the use of force to be justified, even on these 
accounts, the threat must be grave, the main aim of the military 
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action must be to stop or prevent the threat, the use of force must 
be exercised only after all other peaceful means for resolving the 
conflict have been exhausted, and when the implications of the 
military intervention will not be more severe than non-
intervention.135 In the absence of clear rules, a wide elaboration 
of the emerging humanitarian exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force might lead to the use of force for solving not only 
survival humanitarian crises, but also a wide range of crises.136 
In any event, even these grounds for intervention are still 
contested. In 2005, at the world summit, “the states of the world 
confirmed that the UN [sic] Charter’s provisions regarding the 
use of force and its exceptions . . . were sufficient to address the 
wide variety of threats to peace and international security.”137 
Furthermore, “[a]ny forcible intervention without UN [sic] 
Security Council authorization and which is not covered by the 
conditions for the right of self-defense—even one which is driven 
by moral and humanitarian considerations—is a violation of 
state sovereignty and prima facie of the prohibition on the use of 
force.138 This supposition seems to preclude the possibility of a 
pro-democratic intervention. Even if a full right to democracy is 
recognized, this would not justify a military intervention merely 
on the basis that a state is non-democratic.139 One has to 
distinguish between the right to democratic entitlement and a 
separate question of the right to use force in order to establish, 
restore or maintain democracy—which is not supported by 
either state practice or opinio juris.140 Even a recognized right to 
democracy would not prevail over the jus cogens prohibition on 
the use of force as enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.141 
Moreover, it is also questionable whether a forcible 
intervention of a foreign state can actually bring about 
democracy in general—and a stable democracy in particular—
especially where a social and cultural basis for democracy was 
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lacking in the first place.142 
We raise the question of forcible intervention only to 
mention some of the objections to a right to democracy. In any 
case, we refer to positive international law which recognizes a 
right to democracy, as we have seen in Section II of the article. 
We raise concerns as to why this right is hardly debated when it 
comes to clearly undemocratic states and is not granted 
unequivocal declaration, and to highlight the gloomy reality that 
we live in a non-democratic world. 
B. NON-DEMOCRATIC WORLD 
It is said that “a political system is either a democracy or 
not. The latter, in contrast, is gradual—democracy is a question 
of degree. Both concepts, however, are complementary and not 
mutually exclusive.”143 The Economist’s Democracy Index 2016 
distinguishes between four types of regimes: “full democracies,” 
“flawed democracies,” “hybrid regimes,” and “authoritarian 
regimes,” which are based upon five categories: electoral process 
and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, 
political participation, and political culture.144 According to the 
2016 index, only nineteen countries (compared to twenty-four in 
2014) are considered full democracies, fifty-seven countries 
(compare to fifty-two in 2014) are considered flawed 
democracies, forty countries (compared to thirty-nine in 2014) 
are considered hybrid regimes, while fifty-one countries 
(compare to fifty-two in 2014) are considered authoritarian 
regimes.145 Around 2.6 billion people, the report states, or over 
one-third of the world’s population, live in a country under 
authoritarian rule.146 Taken together with hybrid regimes, over 
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forty percent of the world population does not live in a 
democratic regime, either full or flawed.147 The Economist 
Intelligence Unit also reveals a disturbing trend of regressing 
previously-attained progress in recent years.148 Indeed, Magen 
demonstrated how “the global democratic wave hit the shoal 
somewhere around 1999–2000, plateaued between 2000 and 
2005, and has since suffered sustained reversals. By 2015 the 
condition of global democratic institutions and procedures 
declined for nine consecutive years.”149 
This is the sad reality of the world we live in, albeit the 
optimistic assertions of some international scholars. While in 
Western countries and a number of non-Western countries the 
right to democracy exists in practice, a large portion of the 
world’s population still live in non-democratic and authoritarian 
regimes, some of which can be described as outlaws.150 We are 
surely aware of the problem that such categorization of 
democracy “has been on Western terms and has been unequal; 
many emerging states have found it nearly impossible to adhere 
to the Western model.”151 In this Article, we focus first on the 
narrower procedural aspect of democracy; on electoral 
democracy, which ought to be more acceptable. We argue that if 
international law was meant to protect these people, it failed; 
the UDHR is lacking and reflects a compromise with the Soviet 
Regime. Although the ICCPR adequately preaches democratic 
systems (notwithstanding the missing emphasis on multiparty 
systems), many of the member states do not have one in practice. 
In the General Assembly and other U.N. institutions, the voices 
of non-democratic states are loudly heard, and countries that are 
a part of the Human Rights Council violate Article 25 of the 
ICCPR every day.152 
Of course, one of the biggest problems of international law 
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is enforcement.153 And herein lies one of the obstacles: it is easier 
to enforce international human rights law upon democratic 
regimes which demonstrate a broad pattern of cooperation and 
compliance than upon non-democratic and outlaw states.154 
Unfortunately, research shows that human rights treaties have 
not systematically improved human rights outcomes.155 In fact, 
certain authoritarian regimes have actually engaged in more 
violations after ratifying human rights treaties.156 While only a 
few dozen states ratified the ICCPR during its birth in 1976, by 
2012, almost 170 countries have ratified it.157 However, the 
average global political rights score as measured by Freedom 
House has only moderately improved.158 One should realize that 
in the current composition of the U.N., there is hardly a chance 
for Article 25 to be enforced and applied in non-democratic and 
outlaw states.159 
V. A MODEST AND LESS MODEST PROPOSAL 
A. MULTIPARTY AND PLURALIST ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
One of the hypothetical solutions could be amending Article 
25(b) of the ICCPR—explicating the meaning of “genuine” 
elections by inserting, after the word “genuine,” the term 
“multiparty and pluralist” to the obliging characteristics of the 
electoral system.160 This process can be useful because “genuine” 
democratic states would be willing to join such an amendment, 
and “non-genuine” democratic states would hesitate before 
joining such a treaty. Nevertheless, amending Article 25(b) 
carries with it three major problems. First, the process of re-
negotiation of the treaty amendment and bringing the amended 
treaty into force for all the parties can be protracted, which often 
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can be more difficult than the negotiation and enforcement of the 
original treaty.161 Second, the new amendment, upon its coming 
into forces, shall only be binding upon those States Parties which 
have accepted it.162 Other state parties would still be bound by 
the provisions of the original Covenant but not by amendments 
which they have not accepted.163 Third, such a move might 
create a negative arrangement according to which the current 
terminology of Article 25 excludes multiparty elections.164 This 
is an undesirable result. 
The more modest and effective solution is to focus on the 
interpretation of Article 25.165 The appropriate interpretation of 
the ICCPR is that elections must “provide voters with a free 
choice among legitimate alternatives.”166 If this is indeed the 
case, international law must make a clear statement that single-
party elections and alike are incompatible with genuine 
elections as they cannot guarantee the “free will of the electors” 
as required by Article 25(b).167 As Robert Goodin claimed, 
“insofar as the citizens’ choice is limited to a single party and a 
single programme, the citizens cannot really make a choice . . . 
so one-party democracy is undemocratic.”168 This should be 
made clear and expressly stated by the Human Rights 
Committee which publishes its interpretation of the content of 
human rights provisions, which are considered 
“authoritative.”169 It would also be valuable if this interpretation 
would be accompanied by an unequivocal declaration by the 
United Nations General Assembly.170 But such an interpretation 
and a General Assembly declaration would not have a binding 
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force.171 Here, we can learn an important lesson from the 
Helsinki Accord. 
B. LESSONS FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORD 
Franck claimed that there must be consequences when the 
government refuses to conduct free and fair elections or abide by 
their results, and that these consequences are in the form of 
“sanctions, blockade or military intervention in limited 
circumstances.”172 We are not advocating in favor of such 
enforcement mechanisms. An emphasis on the correct 
construction of a “genuine” electoral democracy would not get rid 
of despotic regimes overnight, but it would be a significant 
declaration of principle and as such constitute an initial step 
that may help democratic elements in non-democratic societies 
overcome despots.173 Studies demonstrate that in some 
countries, international human rights treaties had an impact on 
the public awareness, creating the belief that the government 
should comply with treaties it has ratified.174 Likewise, an 
international recognition of a right could have an influence in 
the internal-domestic sphere; especially in regimes with buds of 
democracy, even a toothless declaration can foster 
democratization processes.175 
Additionally, there is a notable precedent which 
demonstrates the success of soft law.176 The Helsinki Accords—
signed in 1975 by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe—formed important principles to reduce the 
cold war tensions in Europe by including a specific section on 
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fundamental rights and recognizing principles such as 
territorial integrity of States and peaceful settlements of 
disputes.177 In principle VII of the Accords, the participating 
states agree to “act in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and to “fulfil their 
obligations as set forth in the international declarations and 
agreements . . . including, inter alia, the International 
Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.”178 
Since the Accords does not have binding force as an international 
treaty,179 the affirmation by the former Soviet Union of its 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms was 
dismissed at the time as mere verbiage and the Soviet leaders 
saw it as a victory for the communist cause.180 The West 
recognized its limitations and received in return a vague and 
unenforceable promise to respect human rights.181 
However, these non-binding documents can have a legal 
significance and even become binding customary international 
law.182 Even non-binding agreements can have an authoritative 
and controlling force.183 Undeniably, the Helsinki Accords 
eventually proved these claims as to the recognition of human 
rights, encouraging domestic Soviet opposition groups and 
indirectly helping those groups topple the Soviet despots.184 As 
Dimitrijevic remarks with regard to the Accords, “the signatory 
States would not risk political and moral responsibility . . . by 
not complying with the agreed obligations . . . . Constant 
reminders by the public abroad and at home threaten a nation’s 
prestige, which is in itself an element of power to be neglected 
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only at one’s own peril.”185 The name “Helsinki” became the 
rallying cry in the fight against the Kremlin. Whether or not the 
Helsinki Accords hastened the opposition struggle has not been 
definitively answered, but at the very least it provided them with 
“ideological ammunition” and significant international support, 
based upon the Soviet Union explicit obligation.186 Words have a 
force of their own when they are included in international 
agreements, non-binding treaties, and a fortiori binding 
treaties.187 
C. OBLIGATORY MONITORING SYSTEM 
International law’s modest approach to democracy must 
focus on genuine elections through which popular consent may 
manifest itself.188 The clarification of the meaning of “genuine 
elections” is a necessary step for promoting the right to 
democracy, but it is insufficient.189 What is required is a general 
and obligatory international monitoring of elections.190 Franck 
notes that the U.N.’s mission to oversee the elections in Haiti in 
1990 can be understood “as the first instance in which the United 
Nations, acting at the request of a national government, 
intervened in the electoral process solely to validate the 
legitimacy of the outcome.”191 Since then, international election 
monitoring has become a widespread practice.192 Global and 
regional international organizations are increasingly involved in 
observing national elections and the U.N. has developed 
important election-monitoring activities and institutions.193 In 
2005, the secretariat of the U.N. endorsed the Declaration of 
Principles for International Election Observation,194 and in 
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2011, the General Assembly adopted the Resolution on 
Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing 
Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of 
Democracy, which, inter alia, acknowledges “the importance of 
international election observation for the promotion of free and 
fair elections and its contribution to enhancing the integrity of 
election processes.”195 However, international law does not 
require international observation of elections.196 Such 
observation is exercised upon the invitation of states, i.e., it is 
voluntary, and unfortunately, still exceptional.197 Apart from 
overcoming the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
such consent to monitoring serves another function: requiring all 
major political groups to agree to the U.N. presence encourages 
negotiation and participation of all major parties in the 
agreement to monitoring.198 Nonetheless, as Franck rightly 
observed, “few states are likely to volunteer as long as 
participation in international monitoring is tantamount to a 
government’s admission that it does not have credibility with its 
own people.”199 We argue that international observation of 
national elections must become a general obligation in which all 
states participate; it ought to be “an unremarkable universal 
habit.”200 
There are some regional antecedents supporting our 
approach. Some intergovernmental organizations (such as the 
OSCE or the African Union Department of Election Assistance) 
have required member-states to permit international 
observation of elections.201 
We are aware that this proposal for obligatory international 
observation mechanisms of elections within independent states 
may be considered intrusive and in conflict with the principle of 
non-intervention.202 It requires a dual attitude shift from both 
the U.N. and states; the U.N. must no longer consider election 
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monitoring as an “exceptional activity of the organization.”203 
The U.N. wants to reduce its role in monitoring elections, since 
the presupposition is that “a decline in demand for United 
Nations assistance would indicate that the Organization has 
fulfilled its role successfully and can focus on other important 
elements of the democratization process such as post-election 
follow-up and institutionalization.”204 But the international 
community still faces momentous challenges in enhancing the 
right to political participation and promoting democracy. It 
should be clear that the promotion of genuine democracy is not 
an exhibit of disrespect for state sovereignty but rather a 
reflection of deep commitment to popular self-rule, guided by the 
principle of self-determination.205 From the states’ perspective, 
election monitoring must be “reconciled in the minds of 
governments with their residual sovereignty.”206 In order for the 
interference with the principle of non-intervention to be minimal 
yet maintain an effective monitoring mechanism, several 
conditions must be met: first, all states must unequivocally 
repudiate the use of military force—not in accordance with 
existing international rules—to compel compliance with the 
right to democracy.207 Second, the validity of the election’s 
results will not be dependent upon the monitoring report. It 
should be the governments’ own understanding that election 
monitoring mechanisms are a useful tool to bestow legitimacy to 
their democratic elections.208 Third, the obligatory monitoring 
mechanisms must be limited to “observation” and not 
“supervision.” The latter is the direct involvement in the 
election’s machinery. The former is a less direct involvement 
which aims to insure free and fair elections.209 Of course, upon 
the request of the states themselves, the U.N.’s assistance can 
simultaneously include a more refined mission that would assist 
with the design and operation of the electoral process.210 Finally, 
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in the end of this observation mission, a report would be issued, 
which describes the process’s fairness and certifies that the 
elections were free, fair and ultimately, genuine.211 
The goal would be to make the results of the monitoring 
transparent and globally published, and to shift the world’s focus 
and pressure on those countries which do not conduct genuine 
elections.212 Since the monitoring system should have no formal 
influence upon an individual election’s results, it is still 
respectful of state’s sovereignty, yet remains faithful to 
international obligations.213 
Importantly, procedural democracy is merely the starting 
point and we should emphasize that the substance of democratic 
governance must not be reduced to mere electoralism.214 
However, “embracing periodic genuine elections as a foundation 
of international governmental legitimacy is important evidence 
of the widespread acceptance of democracy, both as a right and 
a human heritage. Elections neither ensure democracy, nor, 
even more broadly, do they establish peace, security, freedom, or 
justice; yet, elections clarify and reaffirm those aspirations,”215 
as long as the process is genuine.216 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We wish to conclude our Article where we began it—with 
the Arab Spring. Gerald Butt recently wrote that “the reality is 
that Arab democracy has made little progress thus far in 
breaking patterns of leadership established during long decades 
of autocratic rule. The Arab Spring promised much, but thus far 
it has achieved little.”217 In Egypt, notwithstanding presidential 
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and parliamentary elections and three referendums, the 
military and security services remain the power behind these 
displays of democracy.218 In Syria, the one-party Presidential 
elections are taking place in the absence of free debate or a 
serious competitor to Bashar al-Assad and are merely a 
formality.219 And in Libya, the chances of an inclusive 
democratic system taking root in the foreseeable future seems 
remote.220 Tunisia is the only democratic success story.221 In 
Arab countries that were largely untouched by the Arab 
uprisings, such as Iraq and Lebanon, the democratic processes 
have been distorted by sectarianism, and the electorate is denied 
the opportunity to choose candidates espousing the common 
good of the nation as a whole.222 Democracy in Algeria is 
practiced under the shadow of the military and the interests of 
the ruling elite, and in Jordan and Morocco, the Monarchs still 
control the political life.223 At present, Butt concludes, 
Arab countries . . . are practising democracy in different 
ways and to differing degrees. But one vital ingredient is 
missing—politics in its broadest sense . . . . When 
elections become a contest among competing political 
visions, then the annual calendar of voting dates in the 
Arab Middle East will have real meaning.224 
International law instruments have advanced the right to 
procedural democracy. Yet, we still live in a largely non-
democratic world. As Pippa Norris writes, “the core principles of 
electoral integrity have been long endorsed by the international 
community, but unless the standards of elections reflect these 
principles, by eliminating common malpractice and enforcing 
human rights, contests will fail to strengthen democracy and 
reduce conflict.”225 The data that Magen provides is a source for 
great concern. Since 2006, there has been no net expansion in 
the number of electoral democracies, and the number of electoral 
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and liberal democracies has actually slightly declined.226 The 
average level of freedom in the world has slightly declined as 
well.227 Additionally, between 2000 and 2015, 17.6 of world 
democracies broke down, by means of coups, fixed elections, 
etc.—a very high percentage compared with relatively low rates 
of eight percent from 1984–1993, and eleven percent from 1994–
2003.228 With the risk to the erosion of the right to democracy, 
international law must take progressive action. Insisting on the 
correct interpretation to the meaning of “genuine election” as 
explicitly including multiparty and pluralist electoral 
systems,229 coupled with a global monitoring system of elections, 
as we propose in this article, should provide powerful means for 
the real promotion and protection of the right to genuine 
electoral democracy. 
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